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Neuroimaging studies typically identify neural activity correlated with the predictions of highly parameterized models, like the many
reward prediction error (RPE)models used to study reinforcement learning. Identified brain areasmight encode RPEs or, alternatively,
only have activity correlated with RPE model predictions. Here, we use an alternate axiomatic approach rooted in economic theory to
formally test the entire class of RPE models on neural data. We show that measurements of human neural activity from the striatum,
medial prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and posterior cingulate cortex satisfy necessary and sufficient conditions for the entire class of RPE
models. However, activity measured from the anterior insula falsifies the axiomatic model, and therefore no RPEmodel can account for
measured activity. Further analysis suggests the anterior insulamight instead encode something related to the salience of an outcome.As
cognitive neuroscience matures and models proliferate, formal approaches of this kind that assess entire model classes rather than
specific model exemplars may take on increased significance.
Introduction
Our understanding of the natural world progresses through the
development of explanatorymodels designed to capture compact
descriptions of physical events. Within neuroscience, these ex-
planatory models tend to develop through a process of competi-
tive evolution in which highly specified models are tested against
one another. Other disciplines, including physics and economics,
often employ an alternative approach, dividing the space of all
possible models into subdomains and then attempting to falsify
the hypothesis that one or more members of an entire class of
models can account for a set of empirical observations. These
model classes are typically defined by sets of testable rules called
axioms. Popper (1959) argued that the most powerful test of any
theory derives from formal efforts aimed at falsification. In this
tradition, the axiomatic approach attempts to falsify entiremodel
classes.
Dopamine neurons are thought to encode a reward prediction
error (RPE) signal, the difference between experienced and pre-
dicted rewards. Numerous studies have fit specific parameterized
RPEmodels tomeasurements of dopamineneuron activity (Schultz
et al., 1997; Hollerman and Schultz, 1998; Nakahara et al., 2004;
Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Joshua et al., 2008; Matsumoto and Hi-
kosaka, 2009) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
measurements of neural activity in dopamine target areas (McClure
et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003, 2004; Seymour et al., 2004; Abler
et al., 2006; Li et al., 2006; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Behrens et al.,
2008; D’Ardenne et al., 2008; Hare et al., 2008). Model com-
petitions have shown that parameterized temporal difference
approaches (Sutton and Barto, 1990) account for electrophysio-
logical data better (Schultz et al., 1997) than RPE models related
to the approach of Rescorla and Wagner (1972). Unfortunately,
comparing correlation coefficients for different RPEmodels can-
not tell us whether key features of dopamine-related activity are
fundamentally incompatible with specific critical features of the
entire class of possible RPE models. The regression approach
cannot, in principle, falsify the hypothesis that dopamine-related
activity encodes some kind of RPE signal and therefore cannot
formally test this hypothesis.
Caplin and Dean recently examined the necessary and suffi-
cient properties of any RPE signal (Caplin and Dean, 2008a,b),
finding that any such signal must possess three critical features.
They showed that if any one of these features is absent, the ob-
served signal cannot represent an RPE signal regardless of
whether it is correlated with specific parameterized RPE models.
If all of these features are present, then themeasured signal meets
criteria of both necessity and sufficiency for representing an RPE
signal. By empirically testing these formal mathematical axioms,
it is possible to test the entire class of RPE models for a neural
signal measured from any brain area.
To axiomatically test the hypothesis that specific neural sig-
nals can encode RPEs, we used fMRI to measure blood oxygen
level-dependent (BOLD) activity as subjects played monetary
lotteries for real money. We asked whether BOLD responses in
specific candidate RPE areas satisfied the necessary and sufficient
criteria for encoding RPEs. Any neural signal falsifying one or
more axioms cannot in principle encode any type of RPE signal.
Such a signal cannot be accounted for by any model in the RPE
model class. We also tested whether any candidate RPE area
might alternatively encode the absolute value of the RPE signal, a
quantity related to saliency.
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Materials andMethods
Subjects. Fourteen paid volunteers participated
in the experiment (nine female, all right-
handed, mean age  26.0 years). All subjects
participated in two scanning sessions. Two
subjects were excluded from further analysis
due to excessive head motion during the scan-
ning sessions. Participants gave informed con-
sent in accordance with the procedures of the
University Committee on Activities Involving
Human Subjects of New York University (New
York, NY).
Experimental task. Before scanning, subjects
were endowed with $100 in cash. Subjects also
received a show-up fee of $35 at the end of each
scanning session, regardless of task earnings.
On each trial, subjects chose between two
monetary lotteries, an “observation lottery”
and a “decoy lottery,” where the probability of
each prize was represented by the area of that
prize’s slice (Fig. 1A). To test the axiomatic
model, it was necessary to collect data with two
prizes available ($5, $5) at a variety of
probabilities (0–100% in 25% increments).
Thus, the observation lottery set consisted of
five lotteries that yielded eight possible out-
comes and thus eight possible trial types. To
ensure that subjects usually chose from the ob-
servation set, the decoy lottery always had a
lower mathematical expected value (ranging
from $1.25 to $5 lower). The decoy set also
included prizes ($0, $10) not available in
any observation lottery. Subjects were required
to choose between an observation lottery and a
decoy lottery to ensure that they were actively
engaged in the task. After a 12.5 s fixation pe-
riod, options were presented for 5 s. The fixa-
tion cross was extinguished, indicating that the
subject had 1.25 s to make their selection by
button press. After a 7.5 s delay period, the prize was revealed for 3.75 s as
a change in the color of that prize’s slice in the chosen lottery. If a subject
failed to make a button press in the required time window, the subject
lost $10. Out of a total of 3024 trials completed, subjects missed 21 trials
and chose the decoy lottery in 28 trials, completing 2975 trials to the
observation set.
Imaging. Imaging data were collected with a Siemens Allegra 3 tesla
head-only scanner equipped with a head coil from Nova Medical. T2*-
weighted images were collected using an echo planar imaging sequence.
We collected 23 slices oriented parallel to the anterior commissure-
posterior commissure (AC-PC) plane [repetition time (TR)  1.25 s,
echo time (TE)  30 ms, ascending interleaved order, 3  3  3 mm,
64 64 matrix in a 192 mm field of view (FOV)]. This volume provided
coverage of the subcortical, frontal, and midbrain regions of interest
while omitting part of the parietal lobe and the crown of the skull in all
subjects. Each scan consisted of 396 sequential sets of images. The first
four images were discarded to avoid T1 saturation effects. There were 16
trials during each scan. Each trial lasted 30 s (Fig. 1A). Each subject
completed 13–16 scans over two sessions, with most subjects (n  9)
completing eight scans in each session. The dataset consisted of 74,844
volumes, with an average of 130 min of functional data per subject. We
also collected high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical images using a
MP-RAGE pulse sequence (144 sagittal slices, TR 2.5 s, TE 3.93 ms,
inversion time  900 ms, flip angle  8°, 1  1  1 mm, 256  256
matrix in a 256 mm FOV) for coregistration of functional data.
Data analysis. Functional imaging data were analyzed using BrainVoy-
ager QX (Brain Innovation), with additional analyses performed in
MATLAB (MathWorks) and STATA (StataCorp). We sinc interpolated
functional data in time to adjust for staggered slice acquisition. We cor-
rected for any headmovement by realigning all images to the first volume
of the session using six-parameter rigid body transformations. We de-
trended and high-pass filtered (cutoff of three cycles per scan) to remove
low-frequency drift in the signal. We then coregistered images to each
subject’s high-resolution anatomical scan, rotated into the AC-PC plane,
and normalized intoTalairach space using piecewise affine Talairach grid
scaling with trilinear interpolation. Data were spatially and temporally
unsmoothed, except for the group random-effects analysis.
To demonstrate the standard regression approach, we performed
group random-effects analysis using the summary statistics approach.
For this analysis we spatially smoothed all data with an 8mm full width at
half-maximum Gaussian kernel. The regression model consisted of a
single regressor of interest encoding the “predicted RPE” on each trial
during the outcome period, defined for these purposes as the difference
between the reward received in dollars and the expected value of the
lottery. Three additional regressors modeled the option onset, button
press, and outcome onset for all trials. All four regressors were convolved
with the canonical two-gamma hemodynamic impulse response func-
tion (1  6 s, 2  15 s, ratio of peak to undershoot  6). A statistical
map was then generated for the regressor of interest using one-sample t
tests. This map is shown for demonstration purposes only, without any
minimum cluster threshold or corrections for multiple comparisons
(Fig. 1B).
For our principal analysis, we independently defined anatomical re-
gions of interest (ROIs) in individual subjects for 11 brain areas: the
nucleus accumbens, anterior insula, caudate, putamen, medial prefron-
tal cortex, amygdala, posterior cingulate cortex, thalamus, ventral teg-
mental area, substantia nigra, and habenula. These regions were chosen
because they have been found to have activity consistent with specific
RPE models in previous neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies.
Figure 1. Experimental task and group reward prediction error analysis.A, Experimental task designwith timing indicated. On
each trial, subjectswere presentedwith two options, lotterieswith the probability of each prize indicated by the area of the prize’s
slice. After 5 s, the fixation cross was extinguished and the subject had 1.25 s to indicate their decision by pressing a button. After
a delay period, the prize was revealed by a change in the color of the associated slice, here winning $5 from a lottery with a 50%
chance ofwinning $5.B, Areas inwhich neural activitywas correlatedwith the “predicted RPE” in a random-effects group analysis.
At a threshold of p 0.001 (uncorrected), areas of correlation were found in the bilateral nucleus accumbens (coronal and axial
images at y5 and z4, respectively), left putamen (coronal image), and right caudate. Predicted RPEwas defined as the
mathematical difference in dollars between the prize received and the lottery’s expected value. The color scale indicates the t value
of the contrast testing for a significant effect of predicted RPE during the outcome period. Data are overlayed on the mean
normalized image and shown in radiological convention, with the right hemisphere on the left.
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Criteria for these structural definitions, primarily those established by the
Center for Morphometric Analysis (Charlestown, MA) (Rademacher et al.,
1992; Caviness et al., 1996), are described in the supplemental data, and distri-
butions for these definitions across subjects are shown (see Fig. 3 and supple-
mental Figs. 1 and 3, available atwww.jneurosci.org as supplementalmaterial).
Our ROIs were largely located in subcortical and midbrain areas. The
amygdala and posterior cingulate cortex ROIs were located near the
boundaries of our acquisition volume, making these ROIs particularly
susceptible to artifacts from the motion correction algorithm. To limit
these artifacts, we excluded from our ROIs any voxel from a given scan
for which the standard deviation of percentage signal change exceeded
2%, a degree of variance incompatible with a continuous BOLD signal
(supplemental Table 1, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material). In practice, this excluded on average5% of voxels for all struc-
tures except the amygdala (12%) and posterior cingulate cortex (23%). We
further limited theeffectsofmotiononBOLDactivity in individual voxelsby
using a regression model that included the six motion predictor regressors
and their temporal derivatives. We then averaged data across each anatom-
ical ROI to produce amean time course for each ROI that was converted to
percentage signal change using two baseline TRs as indicated.
We made no assumptions about the shape of the hemodynamic re-
sponse functions in our anatomical ROIs, but removed correlations be-
tween time points at the subject and trial-type level by using an AR4
autoregressive model while maintaining consistent time point averages.
We then averaged activity within the 5-TR window, weighting each time
point equally. We computed parameter estimates by ordinary least
squares for each of the eight trial types for the 2975 trials in the observa-
tion set controlling for subject-level differences in activity. We evaluated
the axiomatic RPE model and RPE absolute value model described be-
low, testing for differences between parameter estimates usingWald tests
of linear restriction. We tested the robustness of our results by perform-
ing these analyses while systematically varying the baselinemeasurement
time and the starting time for the 5-TR analysis window.
Axiomatic RPE model. To determine whether the BOLD signal mea-
sured in the striatum and other candidate RPE areas meets the criteria of
necessity and sufficiency for encoding an RPE signal, we formally tested
the RPE hypothesis using the axiomatic model developed by Caplin and
Dean (2008a). This approach makes no specific assumptions about the
precise form of subjective variables like “reward” and “expectation,” which
arenotpart of theRPEhypothesis but are required tobe fully specifiedby the
traditional regression approach. Using this approach, we can thus explicitly
test whether a given neural signal falsifies or satisfies the three conditions of
necessity and sufficiency for the entire class of RPEmodels (subject to some
technical restrictions) (Caplin and Dean, 2008a,b).
For example, all RPE models assume that an RPE signal responds
similarly to any fully anticipated outcome, whether it be winning or
losing $5 or winning an apple or an orange, and the axiomatic model’s
third axiom formally captures that intuition. Surprisingly, this assump-
tion has never been tested on dopamine neurons for prizes with similar
sensory properties, like apple juice and orange juice. The critical feature
of this approach is that if any neural signal does not satisfy this axiom or
either of the other two axioms, then it cannot, in principle, represent an
RPE signal. For the two-prize case we tested, the three axioms are neces-
sary and sufficient criteria for the RPE model class (Caplin et al., 2010).
We tested our measurements of neural activity against the three axi-
oms: consistent prize ordering (axiom 1), consistent lottery ordering
(axiom 2), and no surprise equivalence (axiom 3). The three axioms are
as follows, where (z, p) is neural activity associated with receiving prize
z (e.g., winning $5) from lottery p (e.g., 50% probability of winning $5).
(z) is the one-prize “lottery,” where prize z has 100% probability:
Axiom 1: (z, p) (z, p)f (z, p) (z, p);
Axiom 2: (z, p) (z, p)f (z, p) (z, p);
Axiom 3: (z) (z).
Axiom 1: consistent prize ordering. When expectations (e.g., lotteries)
are fixed and prizes are varied, any difference in activity between prizes
for an RPE signal reflects the different rewards associated with those
prizes. Ranking prizes by neural activity captures those differences, and
these rankings must be the same for all lotteries.
Consider two different lotteries, p and p, which have 25 and 75%
probabilities of winning $5, respectively (Fig. 2A). Caplin and Dean
(2008a) demonstrated that if an RPE signal responds with higher activity
to winning than losing $5 from lottery p, then it must be the case that the
signal also responds with higher activity to winning than losing $5 from
lottery p. Alternatively, if it responds with lower activity for lottery p,
then it must also respond with lower activity for lottery p. Figure 2A
shows a hypothetical result that would falsify this first criterion. Hypo-
thetical neural activity (for example, BOLD activity from some brain
area) is plotted against the probability of winning $5; each point repre-
sents activity associated with receiving a particular prize (winning or
losing $5) from one of the five lotteries in the observation set. Open
circles represent unobservable outcomes; for example, observing the ac-
tivity associated with losing $5 when the probability of winning $5 is
100% is impossible. If more activity is associated with more reward,
higher activity for winning than for losing $5 from lottery p implies that
winning $5 has the higher experienced reward (Fig. 2A). Higher activity
for losing than winning $5 from lottery p implies the opposite, and this
contradiction violates the first axiom. Any crossing of the lines thus
contradicts consistent prize ordering and proves that the activity un-
der study cannot, in principle, encode any form of RPE signal. This
must be true for any two prizes, for example, comparing apples and
oranges; if the activity is higher for apples than oranges for one lot-
tery, it must be higher for all lotteries between apples and oranges for
any RPE representation.
Axiom 2: consistent lottery ordering.When rewards are fixed and expec-
tations (e.g., lotteries) are varied, any difference in activity between lot-
teries for an RPE signal reflects the different predicted rewards of those
lotteries. Ranking lotteries by neural activity captures those differences,
and these rankings must be the same for all prizes (e.g., for both winning
and losing $5).
Figure2. TheaxiomaticRPEmodel.Hypotheticalneural activity is shownfor twoprizes (winning
and losing $5) received from five lotteries with probabilities of winning from 0 to 100%. Only two
prizes are possible, so, for example, the lotterywith a 50%probability of winning $5 also has a 50%
probability of losing $5.A, Example of a violation of axiom1.B, Example of a violation of axiom2. C,
Example of a violation of axiom3.D, A pattern of activitywith no axiomatic violations.
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Consider again lotteries p and p, again with 25 and 75% probabilities
of winning $5, respectively (Fig. 2B). If more activity is associated with
more reward, an RPE signal that responds with lower activity to losing $5
from lottery p than from lottery p implies that p has higher predicted
reward. Therefore, it must also respondwith lower activity to winning $5
from lottery p than from lottery p. Figure 2B shows a violation of this
axiom. Lower activity for losing $5 from lottery p than lottery p implies
that lottery p (the lottery with a 75% chance of winning $5) has the
higher predicted reward. Higher activity for winning $5 from lottery p
than from lottery p implies the opposite. The downward slope of the line
for losing $5 implies that lotteries with a higher probability of winning $5
have higher predicted reward. The upward slope of the line for winning
$5 implies the opposite. For any two lotteries, any difference in the signs
of slopes between the lines for the two prizes contradicts consistent lot-
tery ordering and proves that the activity under study cannot, in princi-
ple, encode any form of RPE signal.
Axiom 3: no surprise equivalence. The final criterion of necessity and
sufficiency identified by Caplin and Dean (2008a) was that RPE signals
must respond identically to all fully predicted outcomes, conditions un-
der which the reward prediction error is zero. If there is no reward pre-
diction error, the signal must always generate the same response
regardless of the prediction.
Consider the two one-prize “lotteries” shown as the filled endpoints of
the lines in Figure 2C. If, as shown in the plot, the signal responds with
less activity to losing than winning $5 when both outcomes are fully
anticipated, this violates the third axiom and proves that the activity
under study cannot, in principle, encode any form of RPE signal.
These three representational constraints must be obeyed by anymem-
ber of the class of RPE models (Caplin and Dean, 2008a,b; Caplin et al.,
2010), whether a Rescorla–Wagner model, a temporal-difference model,
an RPEmodel with a high or low learning rate, or an RPEmodel with any
arbitrary utility function. If an observed neural signal fails to meet any of
these criteria, then the proposition that it can encode an RPE signal can
be considered formally falsified. In contrast, a neural signal that demon-
strates all three properties is one that, in the two-prize case, meets the
sufficient criteria for encoding anRPE signal (as proven for the two-prize
case byCaplin et al., 2010). A pattern of activity satisfying all three axioms
is shown in Figure 2D.
To test the axioms empirically, neural activity estimates are compared
to determinewhether any axioms are violated. To give an example of how
these tests can be performed, consider a situation in which the number of
units of neural activity simply equals the difference between the prize and
the lottery expected value in dollars. Winning $5 when the probability of
winning $5 was only 25% would thus be associated with 7.5 units of
activity. To test the first axiom, consider the lottery with a 25% proba-
bility of winning $5. The activity is higher for winning than losing $5
from this lottery (7.52.5). The first axiom is satisfied if the activity is
also higher for winning than losing $5 from the 50% lottery and the 75%
lottery, as it is (55; 2.57.5). We see that the activity is lower for
losing $5 from the 75% than the 25% lottery (7.52.5). The second
axiom is satisfied if the activity is also lower for winning $5 from the 75%
than the 25% lottery, as it is (2.5 7.5). The two other pairwise compar-
isons must also be checked. Finally, the third axiom is satisfied because
the activity is the same for a fully anticipated win or loss of $5 (0  0).
Such a signal thus obeys all three axioms.
Critically, when we test the axioms we do not make any assumptions
about the magnitude of experienced and predicted rewards for prizes or
lotteries, nor about the hemodynamic response function of subjects or
brain areas. However, since our analysis is performed at the group level,
we do assume that, to the degree that measurements from individual
subjects provide similar degrees of statistical power, these subjects have
the same direction of ordering over prizes and lotteries. For example, we
assume that all subjects either prefer winning to losing $5 or alternatively
prefer losing to winning $5. Dopamine-related activity is thought to
increase with experienced reward and decrease with predicted reward.
Although the theory itself does not require this, if we assume that subjects
prefer winning to losing $5 and prefer lotteries with a higher probability
ofwinning $5, thenwe predict that the axiomswill be satisfied specifically
in the way indicated in the leftmost column in Table 1, which we refer to
as “strongly satisfying” the axioms. They could also be satisfied in many
otherways, including if all the signs in the leftmost columnwere reversed.
Such a pattern might in fact be predicted for the habenula. In contrast to
dopamine neurons, electrophysiological data suggests that habenula
neuron activity decreases with experienced reward and increases with
predicted reward (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2007).
Finally, we refer to the axioms as being “weakly satisfied” if all pairwise
comparisons are consistent with the axioms, but not all tests have the
predicted signs. The most trivial example of this kind of weak satis-
faction would be a pure noise signal for which all pairwise compari-
sons yielded equal values. If all pairwise comparisons were identical
(and hence all lines in a plot like in Fig. 2 were horizontal and over-
lapping), no axiom would be falsified, but the axioms would only be
weakly satisfied. All comparisons would also be equal and, hence, the
axioms only weakly satisfied for an RPE signal if the subject is indif-
ferent between the two prizes, for example, if both prizes are winning
$5. This is another degenerate case of weak satisfaction that would be
of no interest.
We looked for signals that strongly satisfied the axioms by counting
the number of tests with the predicted sign at p 0.05 for a wide range of
baselines and analysis windows. Baselines were selected around the end
of the fixation period and the end of the delay period. BOLDactivity in all
areas was observed to be relatively similar across trial types during these
periods. A range of analysis windows was tested starting before the out-
come period and lasting into the next trial. The axioms are thus satisfied
in ameaningful way for dopamine-related activity (in the strong sense) if
and only if all of our statistical tests have the predicted sign. Because this
requires the conjunction of 10 statistical tests, the probability of the
axioms being satisfied with the predicted signs at p  0.05 for a given
signal for all tests is approximately one in a billion (for seven tests, ex-
cluding tests 2.5 and 2.6, which are not independent of the other tests).
This fact renders the spurious identification of an RPE representation
that strongly satisfies the axioms highly unlikely. For each signal with all
of the predicted signs, we thus used the largest p value for seven tests for
the first and second axioms to compute a conjunction p value and cor-
rected for multiple comparisons (baselines, analysis windows, and
ROIs). For the habenula, we also tested the axiomatic RPEmodelwith the
signs of all statistical tests reversed to search for a sign-reversed RPE
signal (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2007).
RPE absolute value model. To test whether a signal can represent the
magnitude of the RPE signal for the two-prize case we tested, we must
make two assumptions about how the RPE is constructed. First, we as-
sume that the RPE is the mathematical difference between the experi-
enced and predicted reward. Second, we assume (for the two-prize case)
that the predicted reward is equal to pzuz (1 pz)uz, where pz, uz, and
Table 1. Axiomatic RPEmodel statistical tests
Axiom NAcc AI Caud Put MPFC Am PCC Thal
1.1         
1.2         
1.3         
2.1         
2.2         
2.3         
2.4         
2.5         
2.6         
3         
Testing the three axioms of the axiomatic RPE model on our data requires 10 statistical tests. Wald tests of linear
restriction were performed on parameter estimates computed with a baseline of TR 9–10 and an analysis window
of TR 26–30 (parameter estimates for the nucleus accumbens and anterior insula are shown in Figure 4) with the
sign of all significant tests indicated ( p 0.05).We predicted that RPE signals would satisfy the axioms in theway
indicated by the signs in the leftmost column. At p0.05, the nucleus accumbens and caudate each satisfy all three
axioms. The anterior insula and thalamus falsify all three axioms. The amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex each
satisfy two axioms and the putamen and posterior cingulate cortex each satisfy one axiom. Axiomatic statistical test
1.1: {$5, 25%probability of winning $5} {$5, 25%}; 1.2: {$5, 50%} {$5, 50%}; 1.3: {$5, 75%}
{$5, 75%}; 2.1: {$5, 50%} {$5, 25%}; 2.2: {$5, 50%} {$5, 25%}; 2.3: {$5, 75%} {$5, 50%};
2.4: {$5, 75%} {$5, 50%}; 2.5: {$5, 75%} {$5, 25%}; 2.6: {$5, 75%} {$5, 25%}; 3: {$5,
100%} {$5, 0%}. NAcc, Nucleus accumbens; AI, anterior insula; Caud, caudate; Put, putamen; MPFC, medial
prefrontal cortex; Am, amygdala; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; Thal, thalamus.
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uz are the probability and utility of prize z and the utility of prize z,
respectively. Thus, the RPE absolute value (abs) when prize z is received is
(1 pz)abs(uz uz). When prize z is received, it is (1 pz)abs(uz  uz).
Since the second term is always the same for the two-prize case, the RPE
absolute value should be a decreasing function of probability. We test
whether activity decreases with prize probability with the following con-
dition: the activity associated with receiving prize z from lottery p is
higher than that for receiving prize z from lottery p if and only if the
probability of receiving prize z from lottery p is less than the proba-
bility of receiving prize z from lottery p.
In this way we examine the possibility that how surprising an outcome
is, a property related to salience, can be encoded by the BOLD response in
a particular brain area. For the habenulawe also tested for a sign-reversed
RPE absolute value signal.
Results
Traditional regression-based analysis
A number of previous studies have examined the RPE hypothesis
by selecting a fully parameterizedmember of the RPEmodel class
and correlating some element of themodel withmeasured BOLD
activity.We first completed a standard random-effects regression
analysis of this type (Fig. 1B) to allow comparisonwith the results
of our axiomatic RPEmodel analysis. To accomplish this, we had
to make several assumptions about the structure of the neural
representation of concepts like “reward” and “expectation,” vari-
ables which the regressionmodel would notmeasure directly.We
therefore assumed, as have previous studies (D’Ardenne et al.,
2008), that reward, ormore formally the utility function for gains
and losses, is a linear function ofmonetary rewardwith no change
in slope at the origin (the mathematical representation of reward
proposed by Pascal). We also assume that the predicted reward is
equal to the utilities of the prizes weighted by their objective
probabilities (an assumption equivalent to the independence ax-
iom in expected utility theory). If these
assumptions are correct, they require that
the RPE signal be proportional to the dif-
ference in dollars between the outcome
received and the lottery’s expected value.
We also assumed, as have previous studies
(e.g., Li et al., 2006), that the BOLD re-
sponse in all areas would follow the
canonical two-gamma hemodynamic im-
pulse response function, which has been
well validated in sensory and motor cortex
(Friston et al., 1998; Vazquez and Noll,
1998). With these parameterizations in
hand, we found that BOLD activity in the
striatum (including parts of the nucleus ac-
cumbens, putamen, and caudate) was
significantly correlated ( p  0.001, un-
corrected) with the RPE term specified in
this model. This result is consistent with
numerous previous studies (e.g., McClure
et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003, 2004;
Pessiglione et al., 2006). At a more liberal
threshold ( p  0.01), BOLD activity in
the medial prefrontal cortex was also cor-
related with the RPE term in this model,
but not activity in other candidate RPE
areas, including the anterior insula,
amygdala, and posterior cingulate cor-
tex. While these data clearly indicate that
BOLD activity in the striatum is corre-
lated with the predictions of this particu-
lar RPEmodel, they cannot tell uswhether
the data are actually compatible with the RPE hypothesis. This is
because we cannot determine whether the limits to the observed
correlation derive from a fundamental and insurmountable mis-
match between critical properties of the signal and the model or
simply from limitations in the accuracy of ourmeasurements. To
address this issue, we turned next to a test of the necessary and
sufficient signal properties required for any RPE representation.
Testing the RPE hypothesis by the axiomatic method
Neuroimaging studies have identified activity in numerous brain
areas that is correlated with the predictions of particular RPE
models. To test the hypothesis that BOLD activity in these brain
areas can, in principle, be precisely described by at least onemem-
ber of the RPE model class, we first anatomically defined ROIs
and then computed estimates of the average BOLD activity for
each of the eight trial types from the set of observation lotteries.
This allowed us to produce plots of the kind shown in Figure 2 for
each brain area. We then performed statistical tests on these data
in an effort to falsify one or more of the axioms of the RPE
hypothesis.
We first extracted BOLD responses in all subjects from the
nucleus accumbens and the anterior insula (Fig. 3A,B); both
regions were identified as possible RPE areas in previous studies
(e.g., Pessiglione et al., 2006; Voon et al., 2010). We then plotted
the average BOLD responses for the eight trial types, all possible
outcomes from the five observation lotteries (Fig. 3C,D), con-
verted to percentage signal change relative to a baseline selected
as the last twoTRs of the fixation period (TR 9–10). The outcome
of each trial was presented on the screen for three TRs (TR 22–
24). Due to the lag in the hemodynamic response (5 s or four
TRs), we specified our initial analysis window as TR 26–30 (anal-
Figure 3. BOLD responses in the nucleus accumbens and anterior insula. A, B, ROIs were defined in individual subjects by
anatomical criteria for the nucleus accumbens (coronal image) (A) and anterior insula (axial image) (B). The color scale indicates
the number of subjects containing a particular voxel in the individual ROI definitions. Data are overlayed on themean normalized
imageand shown in radiological convention,with the right hemisphere on the left.C,D, Datawere averagedacross all voxels in the
individual anatomical ROIs and replotted as trial averages. Trial averages are color-codedbypredictedRPE for eachof the eight trial
types. Theoutcomeperiod (TR22–24) is indicated. Thewindow (TR26–30) forwhich the axiomswere tested is shown ingray. The
largest SEM for any time point for any trial type is shown on the right. Anatomical ROIs and trial averages for additional areas are
shown in supplemental Figures 1 and 3.
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yses presented below relax this assumption). For each brain area,
we then estimated parameters for each of the eight trial types,
averaging activity across the analysis window, weighting time
points equally. Our methodology necessarily assumes a degree of
consistency across subjects in the relationship between neural
activity and reward. For example, we assume that the sign of the
relationship between neural activity and reward is the same for all
subjects. However, we make no assumptions about the shape of
the hemodynamic response function in different brain areas. The
resulting parameter estimates are plotted for the nucleus accum-
bens (Fig. 4A) and anterior insula (Fig. 4B). For each area, we
then performed 10 Wald tests of linear restriction (Wald, 1943)
on the relations between these parameter estimates that instanti-
ate the three critical axiomatic criteria. Test results are shown in
Table 1. Although testing the axioms requires no assumptions
about the precise ordering of prizes or lotteries, we predicted that
subjects would prefer winning to losing $5 and lotteries with a
higher probability of winning $5 and that BOLD activity would
be related to this preference. This led us to predict that the axioms
would be satisfied in themanner specified in the leftmost column
in Table 1.
For BOLD activity in the nucleus accumbens (Fig. 4A), a sub-
region of the ventral striatum, axiom 1 is satisfied with higher
activity for winning than losing $5 for the three two-prize lotter-
ies (all p 0.001). Axiom 2 is satisfied with all lines significantly
downward sloping (all p 0.05). Finally, axiom 3 is satisfied with
activity not significantly different for the two fully anticipated
outcomes ( p 0.29). This signal thus satisfies all three necessary
and sufficient conditions of the axiomatic RPE model and can
unambiguously encode an RPE signal. All conditions were satis-
fied in exactly themanner predicted, and the conjunction p value
of all the tests corrected for multiple comparisons for the nucleus
accumbens is p 0.000005.
Perhaps surprisingly, the data for the anterior insula indicate a
very different conclusion (Fig. 4B). Axiom 1 is falsified at p 
0.05; the activity is higher for losing than winning $5 from the
75% lottery ( p 0.001), but this is not true for the other lotteries
at p 0.05. Axiom 2 is also falsified at p 0.05 in two different
ways: activity is higher for losing $5 from the 50% than the 25%
lottery ( p  0.032), but this is not true for winning $5, and
activity is lower for winning $5 from the 75% than the 25%
lottery ( p  0.001), but this is not true for losing $5. Finally,
axiom 3 is also falsified; the activity is significantly higher for
losing $5 than winning $5 for the fully anticipated outcomes
( p 0.001). Therefore, this signal falsifies all three necessary and
sufficient conditions of the axiomatic RPE model, only one of
which is required to falsify the hypothesis. Thus, we can conclude
that this signal cannot possibly encode any type of RPE signal.
BOLD activity in the anterior insula, despite the fact that corre-
lations with the predictions of specific RPE models have been
observed in some studies, cannot in principle encode an RPE
signal under the conditions we examined.
We also tested several other areas that previous studies suggest
might encode RPE signals. Anatomical definitions and BOLD
time series for six additional areas are shown in supplemental
Figure 1 (available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental mate-
rial), with tests presented in Table 1. BOLD activity in the caudate
also satisfies all three axioms at p 0.05 and can encode an RPE
signal with a corrected conjunction p 0.000005. Activity in the
putamen, medial prefrontal cortex, and amygdala, but not the
posterior cingulate cortex, satisfies the first axiom at p  0.05.
However, activity in all four areas falsifies the second axiom at
p 0.05, so these signals cannot, in principle, represent an RPE if
the representation is to arise at the time of our analysis window
relative to this specific baseline. The signal in the thalamus also
falsifies all three axioms and cannot encode an RPE signal under
these conditions. However, because measurements of BOLD ac-
tivity are noisy, whether or not a signal satisfies the axiomsmight
depend on the baseline and analysis window used to estimate the
responses; an RPE model might well describe activity at other
times or against other baselines. To test this possibility and to
examine the robustness of our findings, we analyzed signals for a
wide range of baselines and analysis windows.
Assessing the robustness of axiomatic RPEmodel tests
In the preceding section, to test the axiomatic RPE model we
averaged the signal across a 5-TR analysis window (TR 26–30)
beginning around the expected peak of the hemodynamic re-
sponse. We converted the raw signal to percentage signal change
using the last two TRs of the fixation period as a baseline. This
standard practice in fMRI time series analysis adjusts for mag-
netic field drift that detrending and high-pass filtering fail to
correct. To assess the robustness of our results, we counted the
number of tests that were significant at p  0.05 with the pre-
dicted sign for a range of baselines and analysis windows.We plot
the results of this analysis in Figure 5, with results for 11 possible
baselines (including no baseline) plotted against the starting time
of the 5-TR analysis window. Color indicates the number of sig-
nificant tests with the predicted sign for that particular baseline
and analysis window, with the number of significant tests indi-
cated by color.
For certain baselines and analysis windows, BOLD activity in
the nucleus accumbens, caudate, amygdala, and posterior cingu-
late cortex (Fig. 5) had the predicted sign for all 10 tests of the
axiomatic model, all with a corrected conjunction p 0.000005.
Swaths of red in Figure 5 indicate that most tests had the pre-
dicted sign for a range of baselines and analysis windows, suggest-
ing that the axiomatic RPE model is robustly appropriate for
these areas. Signals measured from each of these areas satisfy the
axioms in exactly the way predicted, and thus these signals can
encode RPEs (supplemental Fig. 2, available at www.jneurosci.
org as supplemental material). Although BOLD activity in the
putamen andmedial prefrontal cortex did not have the predicted
sign for all 10 tests for any baseline or analysis window (Fig.
5D,E), there are signals for both areas that satisfy all three axioms
at p 0.05 (supplemental Fig. 2, available at www.jneurosci.org
as supplemental material). For example, for a baseline TR 8–9
and analysis window TR 28–32, the medial prefrontal cortex
Figure 4. Testing the axiomatic RPE model. A, B, Parameter estimates and 95% confidence
intervals are plotted for each trial type for the two prizes (winning and losing $5) against the
probability of winning $5. The data from the nucleus accumbens satisfies all three axioms at
p 0.05 (A). The data from the anterior insula falsifies all three axioms at p 0.05 (B). Test
results are shown in Table 1. Results for additional areas are shown in supplemental Figure 2
(available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
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weakly satisfies all three axioms, and all tests have the predicted
sign except tests 2.1 and 2.2. The signs of these two tests are both
equal (rather thanminus) and therefore weakly satisfy the second
axiom. The putamen signal for a baseline TR 22–23 and analysis
window TR 25–29, for example, also weakly satisfies all three
axioms. The putamen also strongly satisfies the axioms at p 
0.10with a corrected conjunction p 0.0005. For all of these RPE
areas, themajority of tests have the predicted sign for awide range
of baselines and analysis windows.
In contrast, the anterior insula does not appear to satisfy the
criteria for an RPE representation for any baseline or analysis
window. There is only a single baseline and analysis window over
the entire range tested for which this area (Fig. 5B) even has the
predicted sign for the majority (six) of the tests. There exists
no baseline and no analysis window within the range of TR
22–36 for which all three axioms are satisfied for either the
anterior insula or the thalamus; the signal from both areas
cannot possibly encode an RPE representation under the con-
ditions we examined, and this result is robust to choice of
baseline and analysis window.
Our traditional random-effects regression analysis revealed
correlations with our particular RPE model only in the striatum
(Fig. 1B) and, at a more liberal threshold ( p  0.01, uncor-
rected), the medial prefrontal cortex. We were therefore sur-
prised to see several other brain areas fromwhich signals satisfied
the axiomatic RPE model, some of which (amgydala and poste-
rior cingulate cortex) are rarely identified in neuroimaging
studies of the RPE hypothesis. Plotting the average BOLD
response to positive and negative outcomes from the three
two-prize lotteries (the lotteries for which the outcomes were
uncertain) reveals that the hemodynamic responses to outcomes
in the amygdala and posterior cingulate cortex, and also the me-
dial prefrontal cortex, appear to bear little similarity to the canon-
ical hemodynamic response function (Fig. 6). For example, all
three signals terminate at a higher level than they started. This
may suggest that prior regression-based analyses have failed to
identify some RPE signals due to incorrect hemodynamic as-
sumptions. Even in the nucleus accumbens, the hemodynamic pre-
diction appears to fit the data poorly, with the signal rising initially
for all outcomes and then dipping well below the starting level. As
shown here, our analysis methods circumvent these issues.
Although imaging the dopaminergic midbrain structures is
notoriously difficult and few studies have reported success at
identifying possible RPE signals in the midbrain (but see
D’Ardenne et al., 2008), we tested whether the BOLD responses
we extracted at 3 tesla at standard resolution from the ventral
tegmental area and substantia nigra might satisfy the axiomatic
RPE model. We found no evidence of RPE signals in BOLD re-
sponses in either area (supplemental Fig. 4, available at www.
jneurosci.org as supplemental material). These data cannot
address whether spiking patterns in these areas are consistent
with the RPE theory or whether other fMRI measurement tech-
niques might reveal such a signal. We also tested whether BOLD
responses in the habenula might encode an RPE signal or alter-
natively a sign-reversed RPE signal, as a recent electrophysiolog-
ical study has suggested is carried by spiking activity (Matsumoto
and Hikosaka, 2007). We found no evidence for either an RPE or
a sign-reversedRPEBOLD signal in these data (supplemental Fig.
Figure 5. Assessing the robustness of axiomatic RPE model analyses. A–H, Heat maps show results of the axiomatic analysis for a variety of baselines and starting times for the 5-TR
analysis window. Testing the axiomatic model across areas requires 10 statistical tests. The first TR of the baseline is indicated for each 2-TR baseline. The color scale indicates the number
of tests with the predicted sign at p 0.05. The baseline and analysis windows used for the analyses in Figure 4 and Table 1 is indicated by rectangles. All ROIs are defined by anatomical
criteria in individuals. Neural activity in the nucleus accumbens (A), caudate (C), putamen (D), medial prefrontal cortex (E), amygdala (F ), and posterior cingulate cortex (G) has the
predicted result for the majority of tests for a variety of baseline and analysis windows. Neural activity in the anterior insula (B) and thalamus (H ) does not have the predicted sign
regardless of the choice of baseline and analysis window. nb, No baseline. Dopaminergic midbrain and habenula results are shown in supplemental Figure 4 (available at www.jneurosci.
org as supplemental material).
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4, available atwww.jneurosci.org as supplementalmaterial). Sup-
plemental Figure 3 (available at www.jneurosci.org as supple-
mental material) displays ROI definitions and trial averages for
all three areas.
Understanding the anterior insula: RPE absolute value signals
Given previous reports indicating that BOLD activity in the an-
terior insula is often correlated with the predictions of specific
RPE models and our finding that anterior insula activity cannot
serve as an RPE signal, we examined whether the signal in the
anterior insula might encode some other reward-related infor-
mation. One possibility is that the signal encodes something
about how surprising or salient an outcome is to a subject. Al-
though there is little formal agreement regarding the definition of
the term “salience,” one natural assumption would be that an
outcome is more salient if it is less likely. In our experimental
setting, a greater response to an outcomewith lower probability is
equivalent to encoding the absolute value of the RPE signal if we
assume that subjects form their expectations by linearly combin-
ing the utilities of prizes weighted by their probabilities. An RPE
absolute value (“salience”) model has a testable restriction that it
places on our dataset. Activity associated with receiving prize z
from lottery p is higher than activity for receiving prize z from
lottery p if and only if the probability of receiving prize z
from lottery p is less than the probability of receiving prize z from
lottery p. Testing this restriction requires evaluating all 28 pair-
wise comparisons between outcomes.
We replotted the parameter estimates against the probability
of the prize received for the nucleus accumbens and anterior
insula for baseline TR 22–23 and analysis windowTR 24–28 (Fig.
7). For this baseline and analysis window, we found that BOLD
activity in the anterior insula was largely a decreasing function of
prize probability, as would be predicted for a salience signal (Fig.
7B). This was not the case for the nucleus accumbens (Fig. 7A).
We evaluated the 28 tests of the RPE absolute value model for
eight brain areas (Table 2) and found that in the anterior insula,
27 of 28 tests had the predicted sign at p  0.05. In the nucleus
accumbens only 15 of 28 tests had the predicted sign at p 0.05.
We conducted our tests of the RPE absolute value model on
neural signals estimated with a range of baseline and analysis
windows, as we did for the axiomatic RPE model. For each base-
line and analysis window, we counted howmany of the 28 statis-
tical tests were significant at p 0.05 with the predicted sign. In
Figure6. BOLD responses to positive andnegative outcomes.A–H,BOLD responses for positive (red) andnegative (blue) outcomes are plotted, averaged across subjects. Results are for the three
two-prize lotteries. Error bars reflect	SEMacross subjects. Dotted lines represent best fits for a typical regressionmodelwith regressors for optiononset, choice, andoutcomeonset, convolvedwith
the canonical two-gamma hemodynamic impulse response function with fits averaged across subjects.
Figure 7. Testing the RPE absolute value model. A, B, Parameter estimates and 95% confi-
dence intervals are plotted for the two prizes (winning and losing $5) against the probability of
receiving that prize for the anatomical ROIs shown in Figure 3. The baseline is TR 22–23 and the
analysis window TR 24–28. Neural activity in the nucleus accumbens does not appear to be a
decreasing function of prize probability (A). Neural activity in the anterior insula is a largely
decreasing function of prize probability (B), consistent with encoding the absolute value of the
RPE signal, a quantity related to salience.
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Figure 8, we plot the results of this analysis, using the conventions
in Figure 5.Whilemost tests have the predicted sign for a range of
baseline and analysis windows for the anterior insula (Fig. 8B),
this is not the case for the nucleus accumbens (Fig. 8A) or amyg-
dala (Fig. 8F). Some evidence for an RPE absolute value signal
was present in other areas, including the thalamus and caudate in
particular (Fig. 8) and the substantia nigra (supplemental Fig. 5,
available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
Discussion
Neuroimaging studies have identified brain areas where BOLD
activity is correlated with highly specified RPE models. Here, we
used an axiomatic model to show that BOLD activity in the nu-
cleus accumbens satisfies necessary and sufficient conditions for
the RPE model class. This signal can encode RPEs (some RPE
model accurately describes this signal), as previous studies have
suggested but never formally tested. Signals measured from the
caudate, putamen, amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex, and pos-
terior cingulate cortex also satisfy the axiomatic RPE model: for
each area there exists some RPEmodel that can account for mea-
sured activity. This approach required none of the auxiliary as-
sumptions about unobservable subjective variables like reward
and expectation necessary with the traditional regression ap-
proach. Rather than looking for correlation with specific RPE
models, the axiomatic approach tests the properties critical to the
entire RPE model class. We show here that BOLD activity in the
anterior insula falsifies the axiomatic model and cannot, in prin-
ciple, encode RPEs under these conditions, despite positive find-
ings in previous studies with other methods. This BOLD activity
may instead encode a signal related to salience.
Reward prediction error models and the anterior insula
We have identified six brain areas that strongly satisfy the axiom-
atic model. However, our most surprising result is that BOLD
activity in the anterior insula robustly falsifies the axiomatic
model. There is no way of defining or parameterizing an RPE
model to account for this BOLD signal. This is a critical logical
feature of the axiomatic approach, allowing us to unambiguously
contradict the hypothesis that BOLD activity in the anterior in-
sula encodes some kind of RPE signal (Seymour et al., 2004;
Pessiglione et al., 2006; Wittman et al., 2008; Voon et al., 2010).
There is no doubt that anterior insula activity can be correlated
with RPE model predictions. However, our tests suggest that the
limits of observed correlations arise from properties of the signal
that are fundamentally incompatible with any RPE representa-
tion; this activity can be correlated with some RPEmodels rather
than actually encoding some type of RPE signal.
However, it is important to note that we did not find anterior
insula activity correlated with RPE regressors in a traditional
correlation-based analysis. RPE model predictions may be par-
ticularly well correlated with features of a salience representation
in a task other than ours. It may also be that beneath the level of
the BOLD signal, some anterior insula neurons represent RPEs or
some part of an RPE signal, a possibility that we cannot address
here. Our data indicate that aggregate anterior insula activity
measured by fMRI falsifies the axioms and thus cannot encode
RPEs.
Many studies identifying RPE model correlations in the ante-
rior insula involved pain (Seymour et al., 2004) or financial losses
(Pessiglione et al., 2006; Voon et al., 2010), events that may be
particularly salient. The anterior insula is also implicated in rep-
resenting uncertainty (Huettel et al., 2005; Grinband et al., 2006),
prediction errors related to reward variance (Preuschoff et al.,
2006, 2008), and in processing salient stimuli (Jensen et al., 2007;
Seeley et al., 2007). Ullsperger and von Cramon (2003) reported
greater anterior insula activity for negative than for positive feed-
back when negative feedback is less frequent (and thus possibly
more salient).
However, BOLD activity in the anterior insula almost com-
pletely satisfied an alternatemodel for RPE absolute value. In our
task, this activity is a decreasing function of prize probability,
consistent with some notions of salience. This is important, be-
cause dopamine neurons and dopamine-related activity may en-
code salience in addition to or instead of RPEs (Berridge and
Robinson, 1998; Redgrave et al., 1999; Horvitz, 2000; Zink et al.,
2003, 2004). A recent electrophysiology study identified a sub-
population of neurons in the dorsolateral substantia nigra that
increases its activity in response to unexpected appetitive and
aversive events (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009) and, although
controversial, it has been suggested that these are dopamine neu-
rons. Another study identified a subset of dopamine neurons in
anesthetized rats responsive to aversive events (Brischoux et al.,
2009). One must be cautious in interpreting these results with
respect toRPEs, because itmay be problematic to relate activity in
unconscious animals to reward predictions. Although we found
that anterior insula activity may encode RPE absolute value, a
quantity related to salience, we did not find activity in any other
area satisfying the constraints of the RPE absolute value model.
Table 2. RPE absolute valuemodel statistical tests
Condition NAcc AI Caud Put MPFC Am PCC Thal
1.1         
1.2         
1.3         
1.4         
1.5         
1.6         
1.7         
1.8         
1.9         
1.10         
1.11         
1.12         
1.13         
1.14         
1.15         
1.16         
1.17         
1.18         
1.19         
1.20         
1.21         
1.22         
1.23         
1.24         
1.25         
1.26         
1.27         
1.28         
Testing the RPE absolute valuemodel requires 28 statistical tests.Wald tests of linear restrictionwere performed on
parameter estimateswith an analysiswindowof TR 24–28 and a baseline of TR 22–23 (parameter estimates for the
nucleus accumbens andanterior insula are in Figure 7)with the signof all significant tests indicated ( p0.05). The
leftmost column indicates the predicted signs for an RPE absolute value signal. Tests 1.1–1.24 compare outcomes to
other outcomes with lower probability. Tests 1.25–1.28 compare outcomes to other outcomes with the same prize
probability. Tests are listed in supplemental data. ROI abbreviations are as in Table 1. NAcc, Nucleus accumbens; AI,
anterior insula; Caud, caudate; Put, putamen; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; Am, amygdala; PCC, posterior cingu-
late cortex; Thal, thalamus.
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Relating BOLD activity to dopamine
Electrophysiological results suggest that dopamine neurons en-
code RPEs (Schultz et al., 1997; Hollerman and Schultz, 1998;
Nakahara et al., 2004; Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Joshua et al.,
2008; Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009; Zaghloul et al., 2009).
Most of the regions we identified in which BOLD activity could
encode RPEs receive direct dopaminergic projections. Although
dopaminergic drugs influence learning rates (Rutledge et al.,
2009; Voon et al., 2010) andmodulate BOLD activity for putative
striatal RPE signals (Pessiglione et al., 2006; Voon et al., 2010), we
cannot conclude that the signals we measured are due to dopa-
minergic activity. We also cannot determine whether the signals
we measured arise frommultiple sources. We conclude only that
aggregate neural activitymeasured by fMRI satisfies the axioms in
six brain areas.
Although we did not find that BOLD activity in midbrain
dopamine structures encodes RPEs, imaging these particular
structures is difficult.Whether this reflects a discrepancy between
BOLD and spiking activity or the limitations of our imaging pro-
tocol is unclear. D’Ardenne et al. (2008) found positive correla-
tions with specific RPE models in ventral tegmental area BOLD
activity using high-resolution imaging and midbrain-specific
alignment algorithms. The habenula is another difficult-to-
image structure perhaps encoding a sign-reversed RPE signal
(Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2007). We were unable to find evi-
dence for this here using a standard imaging protocol.
Comparing axiomatic and correlation-based approaches
Our finding of RPE signals in the striatum is unsurprising. How-
ever, fewer reports have found possible RPE signals in the medial
prefrontal cortex (Behrens et al., 2008), amygdala (Yacubian et
al., 2006), and posterior cingulate cortex (de Bruijn et al., 2009),
although electrophysiological studies have found evidence for
RPE signals in these areas (McCoy et al., 2003; Belova et al., 2007;
Matsumoto et al., 2007). Our analysis using a typical RPE model
revealed correlations in striatum and, at a liberal threshold, me-
dial prefrontal cortex, but not in amygdala or posterior cingulate
cortex. Our data suggest that the hemodynamic response func-
tions (HRFs) in these areas (Fig. 6) bear little similarity to the
canonicalHRFmost commonly used in standard regression anal-
yses. This suggests that regression-based studies of reward areas
using HRFs appropriate for these regions might produce signifi-
cant correlations. We additionally increased our sensitivity to
possible RPE signals by testing multiple baselines and analysis
windows. Correlation-based approaches could increase their
sensitivity with similar methods.
Unlike the axiomatic approach, the standard approach also
assumes that responses to outcomes received from one-prize
“lotteries” (like a tone followed by juice reward) are intermediate
between responses to uncertain positive and negative outcomes.
Inspection of trial averages reveals that this is not precisely the
case in our data (Fig. 3C and supplemental Fig. 1, available at
www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material). Although our ax-
iomatic methodology makes no assumptions about how these
responses relate to two-prize lotteries, these qualitatively differ-
ent signals, which might differ in magnitude, timing, or both,
identify another weakness of some common approaches.
One disadvantage of the axiomatic approach is that it requires
independently identified ROIs. Regression-based methods can
identify candidate RPE areas with whole brain analyses. For
Figure 8. Assessing the robustness of RPE absolute valuemodel analyses. A–H,Heatmaps show results of the analysis for a variety of baselines and starting times for the 5-TR analysis window.
Testing the RPE absolute valuemodel requires 28 statistical tests. The first TR of the baseline is indicated for each 2-TR baseline. The color scale indicates the number of testswith the predicted result
for an RPE absolute value signal at p 0.05. The baseline and analysis window used for the analyses in Figure 7 and Table 2 is indicated by rectangles. All ROIs are defined by anatomical criteria in
individuals. The neural activity in the anterior insula has the predicted result for anRPE absolute value signal formost tests for a variety of baseline and analysiswindows. The nucleus accumbens and
amygdala do not have the predicted result for an RPE absolute value signal regardless of the choice of baseline and analysis window. nb, No baseline. Dopaminergic midbrain and habenula results
are shown in supplemental Figure 5 (available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
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example, Behrens et al. (2008) identified brain regions where
activity increased with reward magnitude and decreased with
predicted reward in a conjunction analysis. These separate re-
gressors distinguish key features of RPE signals closely related to
the first and second axioms. Such an analysis does not require a
ROI-based approach, but does require additional assumptions
unnecessary in our approach.
Another advantage of correlation-based approaches is that
they can be used to separate multiple components of a neural
signal. We cannot determine whether subelements of BOLD ac-
tivity encode some part of an RPE signal. Multiple regressors
(particularly when appropriately orthogonalized) can separate
signal components in a way that the axiomatic approach cannot
attempt. This feature of the traditional approach is particularly
useful in complex tasks where a single brain area might, for ex-
ample, receive diverse inputs.
While our axiomatic model can determine whether a signal
can or cannot encode RPEs, there are clearly situations in which
correlation-based analyses might more usefully explain neural
data. The axiomatic methodology presented here complements
correlation-based analyses, with each methodology best suited
for addressing particular questions.
The axiomatic methodology is of particular interest because it
adds an additional tool to neuroscience. Where we can falsify at
least one of the axioms we can reject the entire RPE model class.
Where the axioms are satisfied, additional axioms refine the
model. Future research could establish whether the quantity of
dopamine release in these areas measured with electrochemical
methods (Phillips et al., 2003; Day et al., 2007) satisfies the axi-
omaticmodel, directly testing the linkage between RPE represen-
tations and dopamine. Axiomatizing the salience hypothesis
would allow testing conditions of necessity and sufficiency on
BOLD activity in the anterior insula.
Conclusion
This study introduces axiomatic modeling to neuroscience. We
formally tested the RPE hypothesis, showing both that activity
from six brain areas satisfies the axioms of an RPE representation
and that anterior insula activity falsifies the axioms and cannot
possibly encode RPEs under the conditions examined. In con-
trast, the standard regression approach relies on highly parame-
terized models with specific assumptions about reward, beliefs,
and learning when it examines a theory like the hypothesis that
dopamine-related activity encodes RPEs. Such an analysis yields a
correlation coefficient but no direct test of the actual hypothesis
under scrutiny. The axiomatic approach provides a powerful al-
ternative in the Popperian tradition of testing a hypothesis by
attempting to falsify it. By breaking hypotheses down into their
basic assumptions, entire model classes can be tested. These
assumptions identify the ways a model can be proven false.
When data falsify an axiom, new theoretical approaches are
suggested, unlike when low correlations are observed in tradi-
tional analyses. In this sense, the axiomatic approach offers
novel benefits that complement existing approaches to the
analysis of brain function.
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